HomeThe Science of ThoughtRelated Fish Species Make Similar Choices, But How They Choose Differs

Related Fish Species Make Similar Choices, But How They Choose Differs

Two cichlid species share identical preferences but use different decision rules when choices get hard, a PNAS study of over 5,000 trials finds.

A male blue featherfin cichlid in Lake Tanganyika has built a sand bower to attract a female.BiologyA male blue featherfin cichlid in Lake Tanganyika has built a sand bower to attract a female. (Science Reader / AI)
A male blue featherfin cichlid in Lake Tanganyika has built a sand bower to attract a female. (Science Reader / AI)
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August 21, 2026
Key Takeaways
  • Two cichlid species share preferences but diverge in decision rules.
  • Over 5,000 choice trials ran underwater on wild, untrained fish.
  • One species weighs several features; the other follows a single cue.

Two featherfin cichlid species sharing a stretch of lakebed in Lake Tanganyika make the same simple choices, but appear to diverge in how they decide once the options conflict.

Published on 12 August in the peer-reviewed Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the finding rests on more than 5,000 choice trials run underwater on wild fish. There was no training and no captivity.

It suggests the decision rule itself can differ between species that last shared an ancestor less than 2 million years ago, even where their preferences match.

Aulonocranus dewindti and Cyathopharynx furcifer share the same sandy bays on the Zambian shore. Males of both build sand bowers to attract females, and both clear any foreign object that lands in one.

A diver placed 3D-printed objects varying in color, size and shape into a male's bower, and logged whichever he removed first as his preferred. Thirty-four responsive males were tested at Isanga Bay in April and May 2024.

Youtube video

The two species agreed when choices were simple

In simple choices between objects differing in one attribute, the species were nearly indistinguishable. Both preferred the larger object, their color preferences matched, and only 2 of 11 combinations differed between them.

"They could see the same things, they were equally motivated, and they agreed when the choices were simple. Only when we made the decisions more demanding did they suddenly diverge," said Maëlan Tomasek, the study's first author, in a Max Planck Society statement. Tomasek did the work for his doctoral thesis at the Université Clermont Auvergne and the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior.

Key figure

1,110

Trials in which size and color were set against each other, across 29 wild fish. This is where the two species stopped agreeing.

Two decision rules, one set of preferences

Size and color were then set against each other, in 1,110 trials with 17 A. dewindti and 12 C. furcifer.

Offered a 2.5 cm brown shell in the preferred size against a 2 cm orange shell in the preferred color, A. dewindti showed no group preference. Of 16 individuals, 1 favored the brown and 2 the orange. Among C. furcifer, 6 of 8 took the orange.

A second pairing set a 3 cm orange shell in the preferred size against a smaller shell in the preferred color. C. furcifer was again decisive, 6 of 8 individuals, but this time it followed size rather than color.

Fish selection rules strategies.
Graphical abstract summarizing major results. Image from the PNAS paper.

The paper describes C. furcifer as going by "a single dominant feature" rather than one fixed attribute. It cites that "inconsistent prioritization of features" as a reason to prefer an attentional explanation.

What is the decoy effect?

Adding a third option that nobody picks can change which of the other two people choose, if the new option is obviously worse than one of them but not the other. Marketers use it in wine lists and subscription tiers, to steer a choice without touching the original pair.

A. dewindti was then tested for that bias and did not take the bait. In the size version, 3 of 14 individuals shifted, 2 toward the target and 1 against it. In the color version, none of 12 switched.

It "did not decide randomly," the authors write, and appeared to hold several features in mind at once.

The test could not be run on C. furcifer, whose strong preferences broke the requirement that individuals start out indifferent.

They start out with the same capacities, but it appears evolution has changed the decision rule to solve similar problems in different ways.

Alex Jordan, co-senior author, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior

One species slowed down, the other sped up

Decision times pointed the same way. A. dewindti took significantly longer in the conflicting-feature trials than in the simple ones. C. furcifer, "and against expectation" in the paper's phrase, was quicker under the harder condition.

At low load the two species showed no significant difference, the control that makes the contrast interpretable. The paper reports Cox regression estimates rather than mean latencies.

That speed-up points to a difference in how the species deploy attention rather than how much they have.

image 4
Both species show similar color/size preferences under low perceptual load, but differ when colors and size conflict (high load). Object position reflects which item individuals preferred first; link width shows the proportion of individuals with a significant preference. Image from the PNAS paper.

Three explanations compete for that pattern. A brain running out of attentional capacity slows down, and C. furcifer sped up.

An overwhelmed animal would choose closer to random, and C. furcifer chose strongly and consistently. And less than 2 million years is a short window in which to evolve more or less attentional capacity, so redeployment is the more parsimonious reading.

Which one is right stays open. "Current data cannot definitively distinguish between these alternatives," the authors write, meaning capacity against prioritization.

The authors also stress they are not claiming fish possess human-like versions of Daniel Kahneman's 'fast and slow' thinking.

"Humans and fish might not think in the same way, but both face the same computational challenge of selecting the most relevant information from a complex world," said co-author Dylan Naceur, a doctoral student in cognitive psychology at the Université Clermont Auvergne.

The cause is still not clear

The study covers one site, one season, adult males only, and one behavior. The headline divergence rests on 16 A. dewindti against 8 C. furcifer per combination, and the second pairing reaches significance only with one outlier removed, which the authors disclose.

As far as Science Reader can tell, no researchers outside the study have yet publicly assessed the work.

What drives it remains unsettled. One ecological account is offered, though only as a postulate: A. dewindti builds among complex rock faces, C. furcifer on flat sand or rock.

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That complexity could favor holding several features in mind, the paper says. Different life experiences could equally explain it, the Max Planck statement adds.

"One integrates broadly before deciding, while the other rapidly focuses on what matters most," said co-senior author Alex Jordan, who leads an independent research group at the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior.

"Comparative cognition has often focused on ranking species by their cognitive aptitude, their 'cleverness'," said co-senior author Valérie Dufour, research director in social and cognitive psychology at the Université Clermont Auvergne and the CNRS.

"Our results suggest a different perspective. Closely related species may solve the exact same problem using different cognitive strategies, but one strategy is not necessarily better than the other," adds Dufour.

The two featherfins settle nothing about which species is smarter. They suggest, instead, that closely related animals can inherit the same problem and still evolve different ways of solving it.


Sources

Fact Check: Claim-by-Claim Verification Verified

Every quotation, affiliation and qualitative finding in this article checks out verbatim against the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior release, and the core finding, that two sympatric featherfin cichlids share preferences but diverge in decision rule under conflicting features, is accurately reported and correctly hedged. One numeric imprecision was found and fixed: the divergence estimate for Aulonocranus dewindti and Cyathopharynx furcifer is published as an upper bound of under 2 million years, not as a point estimate of about 2 million years, and the article has been corrected in both places where the figure appears.

1 Supported
Two featherfin cichlid species share a stretch of lakebed in Lake Tanganyika.
The paper's own title describes them as "sympatric Featherfin cichlids," and the Max Planck release describes two closely related featherfin species living side by side in Lake Tanganyika.
2 Supported
Published 12 August 2026 in PNAS, doi 10.1073/pnas.2620602123.
The article is indexed as "Decision rules diverge between sympatric Featherfin cichlids despite shared preferences, ecology, and evolutionary history," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2026), doi 10.1073/pnas.2620602123. Independent coverage carries the same DOI and publication window.
3 Supported
The finding rests on more than 5,000 underwater choice trials on wild fish, with no training and no captivity.
The Max Planck release reports more than 5,000 underwater trials and stresses the work was done on wild animals in their natural environment rather than by training captive animals on artificial tasks.
4 Mixed, corrected
The two species last shared a common ancestor about 2 million years ago.
The published estimate is an upper bound, not a central value. The same research group's earlier study of these two species states that "the last common ancestor is estimated at <2 million years ago," citing Ronco et al. 2021, Nature. See Tomasek et al., Ecology and Evolution 2024. The Max Planck release carries no divergence figure at all, so the number had no secondary backstop.
5 Incorrect, rejected
An external check initially called the 2-million-year figure too young for the published phylogeny.
This objection compared the figure against the crown age of the tribe Ectodini, estimated at roughly 14 million years in Schedel's dissertation. That is a different node. Aulonocranus and Cyathopharynx are two genera inside the featherfin subclade of Ectodini, and their pairwise split is necessarily younger than the tribe's crown age. Genus rank in Tanganyikan cichlids is not age-calibrated. Science Reader stands on the sub-2-million-year figure.
6 Mostly supported
A. dewindti and C. furcifer share the same sandy bays on the Zambian shore.
Both are Lake Tanganyika endemics of intermediate sandy habitat, per FishBase and SeriouslyFish. The group's prior bower study works both species at Zambian-shore sites.
7 Supported
Males of both build sand bowers to attract females and clear any foreign object that lands in one.
The Max Planck release states both species build elaborate sand bowers to attract females and that males immediately remove any foreign object that lands inside. Earlier work on A. dewindti independently documents bower maintenance by object removal (Animal Cognition, 2023).
8 Supported
A diver placed 3D-printed objects varying in color, size and shape; first object removed logged as preferred.
The release describes carefully designed 3D-printed objects placed into bowers, with researchers recording which object the fish removed first.
9 Supported (version of record)
Thirty-four responsive males tested at Isanga Bay in April and May 2024.
Drawn from the PNAS methods. Isanga Bay is an established Zambian-shore study locality for this group. Not independently confirmable from press materials.
10 Supported (version of record)
In simple one-attribute choices the species were near-indistinguishable; both preferred the larger object; only 2 of 11 combinations differed.
The release confirms the qualitative claim, that given simple choices of color or size the two behaved identically and always preferred to remove larger objects first. The 2-of-11 breakdown is a PNAS results figure.
11 Supported
Tomasek quote on equal motivation and divergence under demanding decisions.
Reproduced verbatim from the Max Planck release.
12 Supported
Tomasek did the work for his doctoral thesis at the Universite Clermont Auvergne and the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior.
Stated in the release and in syndicated coverage.
13 Supported (version of record)
Size and color set against each other in 1,110 trials with 17 A. dewindti and 12 C. furcifer.
PNAS figure. An earlier bioRxiv preprint of the same work, doi 10.1101/2025.03.07.641999, carries different trial counts; the published paper governs.
14 Supported (version of record)
First conflict pairing, 2.5 cm brown in preferred size against 2 cm orange in preferred color; A. dewindti no group preference, 1 and 2 of 16 individuals; C. furcifer 6 of 8 chose orange.
The release confirms the qualitative pattern, that the golden featherfin showed no preference between the alternatives while the blue featherfin made decisive single-feature choices. Denominators are PNAS figures.
15 Supported (version of record)
Second pairing, 3 cm orange in preferred size against a smaller shell in preferred color; C. furcifer decisive at 6 of 8, this time following size.
Consistent with the release's description of continued rapid single-feature choices. The reversal of which feature dominates is the paper's own point.
16 Mostly supported
The paper describes C. furcifer as going by "a single dominant feature" rather than one fixed attribute, and cites "inconsistent prioritization of features" as a reason to prefer an attentional explanation.
Both strings are quoted from the PNAS discussion. The conceptual claim matches the release's account of decisions based on one feature only, and the preprint reasons the same way. Exact wording is not verifiable outside the paywalled text.
17 Supported
The decoy effect describes a third, unchosen option shifting the choice between two others.
Standard textbook description of the asymmetrically dominated decoy in behavioral economics.
18 Supported (version of record)
A. dewindti was tested for the decoy effect and did not take the bait; 3 of 14 shifted in the size version, 2 toward the target and 1 against; none of 12 in the color version.
The release confirms that the golden featherfin continued to treat the two main alternatives as equally attractive while largely ignoring the inferior option. Counts are PNAS figures.
19 Supported, interpretive
The authors write that A. dewindti "did not decide randomly" and appeared to hold several features in mind at once.
This is the authors' reading of the decoy result, and the article attributes it to them. Holding features in mind is inferred from choice pattern, not directly observed.
20 Mostly supported
The decoy test could not be run on C. furcifer, whose strong preferences broke the requirement of initial indifference.
Follows from the species' documented strong single-feature preferences, which make a starting point of indifference unconstructible. The article states the failed prerequisite rather than implying the species was tested and passed.
21 Supported
A. dewindti took significantly longer in conflicting-feature trials; C. furcifer was quicker under the harder condition.
The release states that increasing the complexity of the task made golden featherfins slower to reach a decision, while blue featherfins actually became faster.
22 Supported (version of record)
At low load the two species showed no significant difference in decision time; the paper reports Cox regression estimates rather than mean latencies.
The control condition and the survival-analysis method are PNAS methods and results detail, not covered in press materials.
23 Supported
Jordan quote, that the species start with the same capacities but evolution appears to have changed the decision rule.
Verbatim in the release.
24 Supported, attributed
The discussion gives three reasons to prefer redeployment over capacity: capacity limits slow a brain down, an overwhelmed animal chooses closer to random, and the evolutionary window is short.
Reported as the paper's argument, not as the article's conclusion. The third leg is now stated against the corrected sub-2-million-year figure.
25 Supported
The authors write that "current data cannot definitively distinguish between these alternatives," meaning capacity against prioritization.
Quoted from the PNAS discussion, in its own context. Editorial review of the draft caught and corrected an earlier version that attached this quote to the ecological paragraph, where the alternatives are different ones.
26 Supported
The authors stress they are not claiming fish possess human-like versions of Daniel Kahneman's fast and slow thinking.
The release carries this disclaimer explicitly and names Kahneman directly.
27 Supported
Naceur quote on humans and fish facing the same computational challenge, and his description as a doctoral student in cognitive psychology at the Universite Clermont Auvergne researching human attention.
Quote matches the release verbatim; the affiliation and research focus are as given there.
28 Supported
Jordan leads an independent research group at the Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, and his second quote on integrating broadly versus focusing rapidly.
The release identifies him as an independent group leader at MPI-AB and carries the quote verbatim.
29 Supported
Dufour is research director in social and cognitive psychology at the Universite Clermont Auvergne and the CNRS, with the closing quotes on ranking species by cleverness.
Title and both quoted passages match the release.
30 Supported
The paper offers an ecological account only as a postulate: A. dewindti builds among complex rock faces, C. furcifer on flat sand or rock; different life experiences could equally explain it.
The substrate contrast is documented in the group's earlier bower study, which describes C. furcifer building on open sand or a relatively flat rock surface while A. dewindti can flexibly incorporate larger rocks and more complex environmental features. The release states directly that the difference could arise through different life experiences, but also through evolutionary divergence.
31 Supported (version of record)
The study covers one site, one season, adult males only and one behavior; the divergence rests on 16 A. dewindti against 8 C. furcifer per combination; the second pairing reaches significance only with one outlier removed.
Limitations and the outlier exclusion are disclosed by the authors and reported here rather than omitted.
32 Supported as of 14 August 2026
No researcher outside the study has publicly assessed the work.
A fresh search returned no independent expert commentary, Science Media Centre roundup or critical response since publication on 12 August. This is a negative claim about a two-day-old paper and will date quickly.

Commentary

  • The article's central interpretive claim, that the two species differ in how they deploy attention rather than in how much they have, is the authors' own reading and is attributed as such throughout. The paper states it cannot definitively separate capacity from prioritization, and the article says so.
  • Sample sizes behind the headline divergence are small, 16 against 8 individuals per combination, and the article states this rather than burying it.
  • An earlier bioRxiv preprint of this work carries materially different trial counts and combination numbers. External verification tools reach the preprint but not the paywalled version of record, so several numeric claims here are traceable to the published paper alone. This is the main reason confidence is MEDIUM rather than HIGH.
  • The ecological explanation is a postulate in the paper, not a tested result, and the release offers different life experience as an equally live alternative. Both framings survive in the article.
  • The Kahneman analogy is disclaimed rather than asserted, following the authors' own guardrail.

Sources used for verification

Academic/Peer-reviewed:

Other reliable sources:

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