HomeThe World We DiscoverWhen a Theory Explains Everything, It Explains Nothing

When a Theory Explains Everything, It Explains Nothing

Many worlds interpretation faces a fatal problem: it permits every possible universe, including ones where physics breaks down. Two physicists explain why.

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The World We Discover · Explore this series
May 20, 2025
Key Takeaways
  • Many Worlds permits universes where physics breaks down entirely
  • The Born rule cannot be derived from Many Worlds without extra assumptions
  • Barandes compares MWI's hidden complexity to the Stone Soup fable

Jacob Barandes keeps a copy of Stone Soup on his desk at Harvard. The children's book sits right next to his Einstein doll, a quiet joke about what happens when a theory promises too much from too little.

For Barandes, a physicist and philosopher of science who teaches in Harvard's physics department, the fable captures something precise about the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The Library That Contains Every Possible Universe

In a conversation with quantum computing theorist Scott Aaronson on the podcast Theories of Everything (video posted above), Barandes reached for an older metaphor first. Jorge Luis Borges' Library of Babel, a fictional library containing every book that could ever be written, in every possible arrangement of letters.

Imagine entering that library and claiming it explains the universe. Somewhere on its shelves sits a book that perfectly describes our world. But it also contains a book where gravity runs backwards, where elephants speak French, where the laws of physics change every Tuesday.

The library explains everything. Which means it explains nothing.

The Many Worlds Interpretation

Proposed by Hugh Everett in 1957, the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) says that every quantum measurement causes the universe to split into parallel branches, one for each possible outcome. No wave function ever collapses. Every possibility simply happens, in its own branch.

Barandes argues that the Many Worlds Interpretation faces exactly this problem.

The theory predicts branches where physics works as we observe it, but also "super maverick branches" where the rules break down entirely. Once you include those, he contends, you are back in the Library of Babel: a framework so permissive it places no constraints on which universes we should expect to inhabit.

The Stone Soup Problem

This is where the children's book enters. In the folktale, soldiers convince a town they can make soup from water and stones. They just need a little seasoning. Then some vegetables. Then meat and broth. By the end, an amazed townsperson exclaims: "All this from just water and stones!"

Barandes sees the same pattern in how the Many Worlds Interpretation gets defended. Its proponents advertise radical simplicity: just the Schrodinger equation and unitary evolution. But to derive anything resembling the physics we actually observe, they quietly add assumption after assumption.

The most stubborn addition involves the Born rule, the equation that tells physicists how to calculate probabilities from quantum states. In a theory where every outcome happens with certainty across parallel branches, probability becomes philosophically strange.

Why should any branch be more "likely" than another if all of them exist?

Key figure

1957

The year Hugh Everett proposed the Many Worlds Interpretation in his PhD thesis. Bryce DeWitt broadcast it to the wider physics community 13 years later, in 1970.

Aaronson, the Schlumberger Chair of Computer Science at the University of Texas at Austin and director of its Quantum Information Center, agrees on this point. "I don't believe any of the so-called derivations of the Born rule from many worlds," he said during the exchange. "Neither Everett's original derivation nor any of the later ones. They all sneak in some additional assumption."

What a Theory Owes Us

Yet Aaronson resists a complete dismissal. He finds Many Worlds indispensable as a teaching tool, particularly when explaining decoherence to quantum computing students. A qubit that has been copied to another qubit behaves exactly as if someone measured it.

The many-worlds picture, he admits, is sometimes the only explanation that clicks.

If a theory doesn't rule anything out, if it doesn't tell us that anything is impossible or at least vanishingly unlikely, then it's vacuous. Then it's not doing anything for us.

Scott Aaronson, University of Texas at Austin

His pragmatism has limits, though.

"I am ultimately not satisfied by a theory that doesn't account for my experience of the world," he said, echoing a point the ancient atomist Democritus made around 400 BC: how can you ignore the senses when the senses provide your evidence?

Barandes pushes the critique further. Even if you accept that the Born rule cannot be derived and simply add it as an extra axiom, there is a structural mismatch. The branches in Many Worlds only emerge approximately, through decoherence at macroscopic scales.

You cannot assign fundamental axioms to objects that are not part of your fundamental ingredients, he argues. That would be like writing axioms of chemistry that assign special properties to tables and chairs.

Two Physicists, No Easy Answers

The exchange reveals something worth noticing about the current state of quantum foundations. Neither physicist claims to have solved the interpretation problem. (For a contrasting defence of Many Worlds, see Sean Carroll's case for the theory.)

Aaronson describes himself as someone who borrows whichever interpretive car gets him where he needs to go.

More On Multiverses

Multiverse: A Journey Through Parallel Worlds

Do we live in a universe which is just one of many? This Science Reader Special provides a basic introduction to the multiverse.

Barandes has proposed his own alternative, a framework called "indivisible stochastic" quantum mechanics that drops the wave function entirely in favour of real degrees of freedom with fundamentally random dynamics.

Their disagreement is not about whether Many Worlds contains useful ideas. It does. The disagreement is about what counts as a scientific explanation, and whether a theory that permits every possible universe can meaningfully explain any particular one.

That question, first sharpened by Everett in 1957, remains genuinely open. A 2025 paper in Pramana revisited the Born rule problem using ergodic theory, and at least three distinct programmes for deriving quantum probability from Many Worlds remain active.

The debate has not stalled. It has deepened.


Sources

Fact Check: Claim-by-Claim Verification Verified

The article's core history and attributions check out: Everett's 1957 origin of Many Worlds, DeWitt's ~1970 popularization, Aaronson's UT Austin titles, the Born rule definition, Barandes' "indivisible stochastic" alternative, and the 2025 Pramana ergodic-theory paper are all supported. No factual errors found; no corrections needed.

1 Supported
Jacob Barandes is a physicist/philosopher of science teaching in Harvard's physics department.
Harvard listings and multiple interviews introduce Barandes as a Harvard physicist working on quantum foundations and conceptual/philosophical aspects of quantum mechanics (show notes). The "philosopher of science" label is interpretive rather than an official title.
2 Mostly supported
Barandes critiques MWI with a Library-of-Babel "explains everything, therefore nothing" analogy.
Barandes publicly criticizes MWI's treatment of probability and typicality, using "super maverick branches" imagery (Barandes on maverick branches). The exact Library-of-Babel wording is the article's faithful framing, not a direct quote that could be verified verbatim.
3 Supported
MWI says each measurement splits the universe into branches with no wavefunction collapse.
Standard expositions describe a real universal wavefunction evolving only by the Schrodinger equation, with outcomes as non-interacting branches rather than collapse (MWI overview, IEP Everettian interpretations).
4 Supported
The Many Worlds Interpretation was proposed by Hugh Everett in 1957.
Everett's "relative state" formulation was published in 1957 in Reviews of Modern Physics and is universally cited as the origin of MWI (historical origin, IEP).
5 Mostly supported
Bryce DeWitt broadcast MWI to the wider physics community 13 years later, in 1970.
DeWitt is consistently credited with popularizing Everett's work and coining "many-worlds" in the early 1970s; his influential papers date 1970–71 and the 1973 volume followed (DeWitt 1970–71 discussion). 1957 + 13 = 1970; the "broadcast" phrasing is interpretive but accurate in substance.
6 Supported
Barandes claims MWI allows "super maverick branches" where physics breaks down.
Barandes explicitly discusses "maverick"/"super maverick" branches where frequencies grossly violate the Born rule, arguing the formalism does not exclude them (Barandes on super maverick branches). "Maverick branches" is critics' terminology, not standard MWI vocabulary — correctly framed as his argument.
7 Supported
MWI proponents advertise radical simplicity: just the Schrodinger equation and unitary evolution.
Canonical MWI expositions emphasize standard unitary dynamics with no collapse postulate or hidden variables, presenting a single-law framework (simplicity claims, measurement-problem review).
8 Supported
The Born rule tells physicists how to calculate probabilities from quantum states.
The Born rule is the standard postulate that outcome probability equals the squared modulus of the corresponding amplitude (Born rule overview).
9 Supported
In MWI, probability is philosophically strange because all branches occur.
The "probability problem" is a central, widely-acknowledged issue in MWI, prompting decision-theoretic, envariance, and measure-theoretic derivation attempts (Born rule & MWI, Everett & probability).
10 Supported
Aaronson is Schlumberger Chair of CS at UT Austin and director of its Quantum Information Center.
Aaronson's own profiles list him as Schlumberger Centennial Chair of Computer Science at UT Austin and director of its Quantum Information Center (Aaronson bio). The article omits "Centennial" but the substance is correct.
11 Supported
Aaronson said he doesn't believe any Born rule derivations from many worlds; they all sneak in an assumption.
Aaronson has repeatedly expressed this skepticism, arguing proposed derivations (Everett's and later decision-theoretic ones) implicitly assume what they try to prove (blog on Born rule derivations, discussion of his position). Article phrasing closely matches his documented stance.
12 Mostly supported
Aaronson finds MWI useful pedagogically, especially for decoherence and copied qubits.
Aaronson uses an Everett-style picture as a teaching aid for branching/decoherence while staying non-committal on MWI as "true" (Aaronson on heuristic use). The exact qubit example could not be confirmed word-for-word, but the described use matches his teaching style.
13 Mostly supported
Pullquote — "If a theory doesn't rule anything out... then it's vacuous." (Aaronson)
The sentiment is a Popperian theme Aaronson broadly endorses (related blog discussion), but the exact sentence could not be traced to a public transcript. It is sourced from the primary podcast and is a faithful representation of his view. Editor note: retained as quoted from the primary video source; could not be independently verified verbatim, hence MEDIUM overall confidence.
14 Mostly supported
Aaronson's view echoes Democritus' point (c. 400 BC) that you cannot ignore the senses.
Democritus (c. 460–370 BC) is associated with atomism and the reason-versus-senses tension; the famous fragment has the senses rebuking reason for overturning the evidence they supply (Democritus and the senses). The "echoing" is the article's interpretive gloss, not a claim that Aaronson named Democritus — correctly framed.
15 Supported
Barandes' structural-mismatch critique: branches emerge from decoherence, so Born axioms can't be assigned to them as fundamental.
Barandes argues that postulating probability axioms over emergent branches is like assigning axioms to "tables and chairs" in a microphysical theory (Barandes on emergent branches). Presented accurately as his philosophical criticism, not consensus.
16 Mostly supported
Neither physicist claims to have solved the interpretation problem; Aaronson borrows "whichever interpretive car" works.
Aaronson is interpretationally pluralistic, using different pictures as tools without endorsing one as final (Aaronson on mixing interpretations); Barandes presents his proposal as developing, not settled. The "interpretive car" metaphor is the article's paraphrase.
17 Supported
Barandes proposed "indivisible stochastic" QM that drops the wavefunction for real degrees of freedom with random dynamics.
Barandes' indivisible stochastic formulation eliminates the wavefunction in favor of real-valued stochastic degrees of freedom under non-Markovian, indivisible laws (nLab entry, "There is no wavefunction"). Still under active development.
18 Mostly supported
The disagreement is about what counts as a scientific explanation and whether a theory permitting every universe can explain a particular one.
A fair synthesis: Barandes targets explanatory adequacy (maverick branches, Born-rule typicality), Aaronson questions whether Born-rule derivations explain anything (explanatory constraints, Aaronson on explanatory standards). Interpretive but captures a genuine tension.
19 Mostly supported
The question Everett sharpened in 1957 remains genuinely open.
The probability/typicality issues in MWI are widely regarded as unresolved; surveys list MWI as a live contender with open problems about probability and empirical explanation (recent Born rule work, measurement-problem review).
20 Supported
A 2025 Pramana paper revisited the Born rule via ergodic theory; at least three derivation programmes remain active.
The cited paper exists — "Born Rule and Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: An Ergodic Approach," Pramana, 2025. Multiple active derivation programmes (decision-theoretic, envariance, measure-theoretic/typicality) are corroborated in the foundations literature (measurement-problem review). Perplexity's "Unclear" was an artifact of a truncated response, not a doubt about the citation.

Commentary

  • This is a conversation-based explainer. Attributed quotes from the Theories of Everything podcast are sourced from the primary video but could not be cross-checked against a public transcript; they are consistent with both physicists' documented public positions.
  • "Maverick branches" and the Library-of-Babel framing are critics' rhetoric, correctly presented as Barandes' argument rather than settled physics.
  • The MWI probability/Born-rule problem is genuinely unresolved and actively debated — the article's "the debate has deepened" framing is accurate.

Sources used for verification

Academic/Peer-reviewed:

Other reliable sources:

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